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# DOMESTIC MARITIME SECURITY

From the navy on patrol to the police on the beat.

BY TIM LYNCH

In our post-9/11 world, management of dockside and coastal security is recognized as vitally important in protecting Canadian interests. The security challenges facing Canada's coast and port facilities were discussed at a workshop on maritime security organized by Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific in Victoria last September. Nearly 200 military and civilian security experts from 18 countries gathered to discuss the security challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region. Federal government departments participating in the conference included the RCMP, Ministry of Transport, Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Canadian Coast Guard. Vancouver and Victoria Police Departments were also present, representing the "police on the beat." Their observations and conclusions have implications for everybody working in the maritime industries.

## Asian Dynamism and Maritime Security

In his keynote security speech, Rear-Admiral Roger Girouard, Commander Maritime Forces Pacific, described a new Asian dynamism arising from globalization, trade liberalization and Asian economic growth. Focusing on the influence of China he noted that the six fastest growing ports in the world are in China, making it the world's largest container market. He compared Shanghai's port — handling 1.78 million standard, 20-foot containers (TEUs) in the month of April 2006 — with Vancouver, Canada's busiest port, handling 1.7 million TEUs in all of 2005.

New shipyards in the Bohai Gulf, Shanghai, and Southern China are scheduled to triple China's capacity, putting China on course to become the world's biggest shipbuilder by 2015. Containerships of 10,000 TEU capacity are on the slipways now, with proposed building of a 13,440 TEU ship in South Korea. With this industrial development in the Indo-Pacific region the demand for Liquefied Natural Gas is expected to surge 40 percent by 2010 and a further 43 percent (to 197 million tons per year) by 2015. Girouard noted that more submarines are in service or are being built in the region than anywhere else on earth.

Against this background Girouard stated "the region is fraught with problems: piracy, maritime terrorism, trans-national maritime crime, illegal fishing, natural disasters, the potential for and reality of conflict at sea, and offshore disputes. These problems, set within a context of rising nationalism, have made the Indo-Pacific maritime environment increasingly brittle." The role of regional navies in humanitarian rescue operations and policing illegal fishing disputes were discussed at workshops. The "brittle" nature of security in the region became apparent from discussions around the offshore threats to Canadian values and property.

## Identifying the Threats

As speakers from throughout the region made clear, maritime security threats in the Indo-Pacific region arise from many sources:

- **Human smuggling and trafficking** — In a session on transnational maritime crime, John McFarlane of the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy reported that human smuggling and trafficking nets between US\$7-12 billion per year in criminal profits, and more than three times that amount if profits from women and children forced into overseas sexual servitude are included. LCdr Mark Everson of the US Navy talked about challenges of combating illicit trafficking and Lt John Bradford, Director, Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Network, US Navy, discussed trends and challenges associated with piracy and hijacking in Southeast Asian waters.
- **Energy security** — The increasing demand for energy was identified as a critical factor in national security. Arjuna Mahendran of the Credit Suisse, Singapore explored the maritime dimensions of global energy competition and showed how Asian firms and consumers are reshaping the global economy. Adm. Rakesh Chopra of the Indian Navy discussed energy security for the Asian region in 2020 and



Two **HMCS Vancouver** naval boarding party members in full armament. On the left is Leading Seaman Alexander Makrodimitras, and on the right is Master Seaman Duane Gall.

beyond, and Dr. Guo Shuyong of Shanghai Jiaotong University in China gave a presentation on China's energy strategy which, given China's potential energy demands, could have repercussions throughout the region.

- Port Security** — Noting that 80 per cent of world trade passed through the world's approximately 4000 ports Harun Hj. Johari, Port of Tanjung Pelapas, Malaysia cautioned, "as ports become bigger they become targets for terrorists, or of being used by terrorists as an entry or exit point for smuggling arms, weapons of mass destruction, terrorist operatives and other materials." One solution to combat this threat is container screening, and Don Krusel of BC's Prince Rupert Port Authority described how Prince Rupert offers the potential for 100 per cent screening of inbound containers (see "Portside Security Technology" **Mariner Life**, December 2006).
- Territorial Claims** — Ambassador Dr. Hasjim Djalal, Advisor to the Indonesian Naval Chief of Staff, gave a dramatic account of managing conflict among countries surrounding the South China Sea. He emphasized the need to respect the interpretation of territorial claims by individual countries in order to achieve a working level of informal dialogue. Canada is not immune to such conflict: Given our country's territorial claims over the management of the Northwest Passage, we might soon be facing challenges with nations like America, Russia, Denmark, Norway and China claiming rights of passage and possibly mineral exploration rights in "Canadian" northern waters.
- Terrorism** — Dr. Michael Intriligator of the University of California, Los Angeles, provided an economic analysis for addressing the challenges of fighting terrorism, looking at each side's need for a steady supply of resources. Stressing the importance of knowing the enemy he stated "The source of terrorism is probably not poverty and ignorance, as is often alleged, but rather humiliation leading to rage and retribution," pointing out that the terrorists of 9/11 were neither poor nor uneducated but middle class and well educated.


## Alphabet Soup — Maritime Security in Canada

Any approach to maritime security needs to be coordinated with land-based security, and in Canada the relationship between land-based and sea-based security forces is currently in a state of renewal, with new alliances being formed to accommodate old structures. In addition there are new international

agreements around ship and port security that Canada has to meet, including the ISPS code (International Ship and Port Facility Security code).

The ISPS code, to which Canada is a signatory, is a maritime security code created as an integral part of the United Nations' International Maritime Organization's (IMO) responsibilities. A comprehensive security regime for international shipping was entered into force on July 1, 2004. The mandatory security measures, adopted in December 2002, include a number of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention, the most far-reaching of which enshrines the new ISPS Code. The ISPS code contains detailed security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B).

To help manage maritime security operations on our coast, Canada has created new organizational entities called Maritime Security Operations Centres (MSOCs). Under the leadership of the Department of National Defense MSOCs were established in the Atlantic, Great Lakes and Pacific regions in March 2005. The



One increasing source of maritime security threats might come from Canada's northern waters, with other countries claiming rights of passage and possibly mineral exploration rights in "Canadian" northern waters.

Pacific MSOC is located at CFB Esquimalt. Personnel from Maritime Command, RCMP, Canadian Coast Guard, CBSA and Transport Canada staff the MSOC. The primary objectives are interoperability among personnel and fusion of all data sources to create one unified and comprehensive maritime picture. Transport Canada has lead responsibility for marine safety and security policy coordination and regulation. MSOCs operate through a unified command structure. Each department conducts surveillance to gather information for its own needs, and shares information with other departments as needed, in accordance with respective legislative requirements for client confidentiality. The MSOC works on terrorism and law enforcement scenarios in close liaison with the US Coast Guard, to test coastal surveillance and enhance communications.

If the MSOC identifies a ship as being under suspicion, possibly arising from information gathered at port of departure, a decision can be made to board the ship either at sea or when it docks. Canadian Forces Maritime ships patrolling the 200 nautical miles offshore limit can intercept and board shipping as part



*Eyes in the sky — the security control room at the Vancouver Port Authority. The perimeter of the Port is monitored through state-of-the-art digital telescopic cameras and software that can scan details of vehicles and individuals.*

of their Canadian territorial defense role, while the RCMP and local police forces like the Vancouver Police Department marine squad provide law enforcement functions within the twelve-mile off shore limit when necessary.

The ultimate scenario from a security perspective is that some marine vessel will be steered alongside a cruise or cargo ship or into Vancouver Port (or some similar location) with a high explosive device or a “dirty bomb” on board. Ideally the goal is to be forewarned about such an incident from intelligence gathering and to restrict movement accordingly. Aside from being prepared to manage such terrorism scenarios, plans have to be in place for dealing with more routine matters such as suspicious vessels that are not in compliance with Canadian regulations or may be trafficking in people, smuggling drugs and so on. The new unified command structure within the MSOC is expected to facilitate such decision-making efficiently and effectively.

Another new security resource established in Canada in January 2004 is the National Risk Assessment Centre (NRAC), within the CBSA. The NRAC, which operates 24/7, serves as an interface between intelligence agencies at the international, national and local levels. The Centre uses sophisticated intelligence-gathering techniques and technology and shares its intelligence with law enforcement partners and field officers across Canada. This information is used to stop entry of high-risk people, illegal contraband, drugs and weapons into Canada. In support of maritime security, the NRAC works closely with MSOCs.

## Security at the Port of Vancouver

At the local “police on the beat” level of security, the Vancouver Harbour Watch Program is made up of public and private volunteer interests including the Vancouver Police Department Marine Squad, Canadian Coast Guard, CBSA, Vancouver Port Authority, BC Pilots, Seabus, Seaspan, Coast Mountain, and such. The program provides a platform for collating information about unusual or suspicious happenings that may be observed by a stakeholder member. BC marine pilots — who are the first Canadian representatives to step foot on any foreign vessel coming into port — are an integral part of this program (see “Piloting: A Symphony of Motion,” *Mariner Life*, Oct. 2006). They, along with other program stakeholders, have a detailed understanding of how the ports operate and when things are not “normal.” The program serves as a frontline intelligence resource and is organized through the RCMP’s Waterfront Enforcement Operation Office at Vancouver Port.

With a \$12.8 million investment the Vancouver Port Authority (VPA) is committed to going above and beyond the ISPS requirements in ensuring maximum security of the perimeter around its territorial responsibilities. The Authority is achieving this goal through absolute control of its gates and doorways. All access points are continuously monitored using digital cameras, and any attempt at tampering with them results in security personnel being dispatched in seconds. The perimeter of the Port is monitored through state-of-the-art digital telescopic cameras and software that can scan details of vehicles and individuals behaving in a manner that is out of the ordinary and follow them around the property. Cargo and passengers have to go through stringent security procedures prior to boarding any ship at the port. VPA is able to profile all ships in dock and it shares information and intelligence with its security partners. Clearly the vision of the VPA is to see the Port of Vancouver being the most secure facility of its kind in the world.

## Enforcement and Education

In researching this article the armed policing role of the American Coast Guard was frequently compared with the Canadian Coast Guard, which does not “guard” Canadian but provides a rescue service among other duties. Recent public debate surrounding CBSA personnel who deserted their posts at the Peace Arch border crossing in response to a police incident in California highlighted the question of whether CBSA personnel should be armed. Canadian Border Service personnel currently function as Peace Officers, having the authority to arrest suspicious individuals at port of entry and relying on the RCMP for law enforcement backup. The RCMP accompanies Border Service or Transport Canada regulatory personnel in boarding a ship prior to docking if a law enforcement concern exists. Clearly, maritime security requires an armed law enforcement capability to uphold compliance with Canadian law. And while the American Coast Guard model was generally regarded as an excessive way for Canada to allocate public funds, there is support for the idea of allowing existing law enforcement capability to evolve to meet identified needs.

Lack of anti-terrorism education was also identified as an obstacle in developing a professional strategy. Acknowledging the McKenzie Institute of Toronto as such an educational resource, Jamie Gibson VPD Marine Squad said, “Public apathy towards security is a problem. Canadians don’t think it can happen here. There is a reluctance to accept that we are on the terrorists’ lists.”



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### Maritime Security Websites

#### Canadian Maritime Forces

<http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca>

#### Canada Border Services Agency

[www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca](http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca)

#### Transport Canada

[www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSecurity/Strategic/mandate.html](http://www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSecurity/Strategic/mandate.html)

#### International Maritime Organization security

[www.imo.org](http://www.imo.org)

#### The Mackenzie Institute

[www.mackenzieinstitute.com](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com)